Investigation of an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease: Hereford, UK 2003  by Kirrage, David et al.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Respiratory Medicine (2007) 101, 1639–16440954-6111/$ - see fro
doi:10.1016/j.rmed.
Corresponding au
E-mail address: b
1Hereford Legionn
Lewis, Darryl Penne
Stacey. Hereford Hos
Simmons. Herefordsh
Health Protection A
Protection Agency, L
Harrison, Carol JoseInvestigation of an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease:
Hereford, UK 2003
David Kirragea, Gary Reynoldsa, Gillian E. Smithb, Babatunde Olowokureb,,
for the Hereford Legionnaires Outbreak Control Team1aHealth Protection Agency, Hereford and Worcestershire Health Protection Unit, Issac Maddox House, Shrub Hill Road,
Worcester WR4 9RW, UK
bHealth Protection Agency, Regional Surveillance Unit (West Midlands), 9th Floor, Ladywood House,
45 Stephenson Street, Birmingham B2 4DY, UK
Received 12 December 2005; accepted 14 November 2006
Available online 21 May 2007KEYWORDS
Cooling tower;
Disease outbreak;
Environmental
exposure;
Epidemiology;
Legionnaires’ diseasent matter & 2007
2006.11.026
thor. Tel.: +44 121
abatunde.olowok
aires’ Outbreak C
lls, and Alan Twe
pitals NHS Trust, M
ire Primary Care T
gency, Regional S
ocal and Regional
ph, and John V. LeSummary
This report describes the investigation and control of a community outbreak of
Legionnaires’ disease in Hereford, UK, in November 2003. Outbreak investigation consisted
of epidemiological survey, identiﬁcation and environmental investigation of potential
sources, microbiological analysis of clinical and environmental samples and mapping the
location of potential sources and the movement and residence of cases. Each identiﬁed
source was allocated a ‘composite score’ based on different zones of exposure and wind
direction. Altogether, 28 cases were identiﬁed, with an overall case fatality rate of 7%. All
cases had epidemiological links to Hereford city centre. The ‘composite score’ identiﬁed a
cluster of cooling towers as being the most likely source of the outbreak. Environmental
samples from one of the cooling towers in the cluster and clinical samples from two
patients were positive for Legionella pneumophilia serogroup 1 and were indistinguishable
by molecular sub-typing. In this outbreak, the use of microbiological, environmental and
epidemiological techniques facilitated the rapid identiﬁcation of a cooling tower as the
source of this outbreak. This study illustrates the continuing importance of cooling towersElsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Hereford 2003 Legionnaires’ outbreak.16Introduction
Legionnaires’ disease (LD) is an environmentally acquired
bacterial pneumonia caused by Legionella species which are
widely distributed in man-made and natural environ-
ments.1,2 Transmission of the disease may, in susceptible
people, follow inhalation of aerosol contaminated with
Legionella.3 Documented sources of contaminated aerosols
include cooling towers, fountains, showers, water taps and
whirlpool spas.4–11
This paper describes an outbreak of LD that occurred in
October 2003 in Hereford, a city in a mainly rural part of the
West Midlands region, UK. At the time of the outbreak the
estimated population of Hereford was 177,000 persons.12
On 24 October 2003 the Consultant in Communicable
Disease Control (CCDC) for Herefordshire was informed of a
case of LD in an elderly man from Hereford City who
subsequently died. On 27 October the CCDC was informed by
the local microbiology laboratory of a further case in an
elderly lady from a village 3miles from the city. The
diagnosis in this case was made following a post-mortem.
The two cases were investigated for evidence of a common
link. Other than a close association in time and place, no
common factors were detected.
As a result of active case-ﬁnding, on 6 November two in-
patients at the local hospital tested positive for Legionella
urinary antigen. A multidisciplinary Outbreak Control Team
(OCT) was convened that day involving members of the
newly formed Health Protection Agency (HPA) as well as the
Primary Care Trust, Hereford County hospital, and Local
Authority. The purpose of the OCTwas to formally declare an
outbreak, deﬁne the magnitude of the outbreak, prevent
further transmission and investigate the source of infection.
Over the next 3 weeks a further 24 cases of LD were
reported to the OCT as a result of active case ﬁnding
including retrospective testing of patients admitted to the
local acute district hospital with pneumonia. The outbreak
received extensive television and print media coverage.13–15
This paper describes the results of the investigation.Criteria Conﬁrmed case
Clinical Clinical diagnosis of pneumonia
Date of onset After 1st October 2003
Epidemiologic Lived in, worked in or had visited
Hereford within 2 weeks of the date
of onset of their disease
Laboratory Isolation of Legionella species from
clinical specimens; or a four-fold or
greater increase in the titre of serum
antibodies against L. pneumophila
serogroup by indirect
immunoﬂuorescent antibody test
(IFAT); or the detection of Legionella
antigens in urineMethods
Epidemiological investigation
The OCT agreed that the case deﬁnitions for LD of the
HPA should be used for the investigation of this outbreak
(Table 1).16
LD is not statutorily notiﬁable in England and Wales
therefore cases were identiﬁed prospectively and retro-
spectively by reviewing laboratory reports and medical
records to identify all persons with pneumonia since 1
August 2003. The case notes of suspected patients were
abstracted and reviewed to identify those who had a
community-acquired pneumonia or a diagnosis of LD. Thosepersons deemed retrospectively to be suspect cases were
contacted via their general practitioner and serum and urine
samples collected for testing. Additionally, local general
practitioners, clinicians in neighbouring hospitals, and
public health colleagues throughout England and Wales
were alerted to the outbreak and asked to forward details of
cases that met the case deﬁnitions to the OCT.
To try and identify the source of the outbreak, investi-
gators interviewed all cases (or a proxy) using a question-
naire based upon the Legionella questionnaire of the HPA.
Information was collected on aspects such as predisposing
risk factors, demographic factors, recent movements within
and outside Hereford and speciﬁc visits or proximity to an
aerosol-generating system (such as domestic potable water
system, cooling towers, decorative fountains or car washes)
during a 14-day period up to and including the day of onset
of symptoms. The information obtained from each case was
then used to generate hypotheses about potential sources of
exposure. For all cases interviews were conducted as soon as
possible after the case had been identiﬁed. Time to
interview after identiﬁcation varied for those identiﬁed
retrospectively (after the outbreak investigation had
started) but was within a few days of diagnosis for those
identiﬁed prospectively.
Patient data were collected and validated by the out-
break team, entered and stored on a Microsoft Access
database and analysed using EpiInfo version 6. The locations
of cooling towers in and around Hereford city centre were
obtained from a register supplied by the Local Authority.
Postcode data for cooling towers and residences of cases
were mapped using a Geographical Information System
(GIS), MapInfo. Distances between place of residence of
cases and the nearest cooling tower were documented.
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The Department of Microbiology and Immunology, County
Hospital, Hereford analysed all clinical specimens. Urine
samples were tested for L. pneumophilia antigen using a
commercial enzyme immunoassay kit (Bartels EIA kit,
Intracel, USA).17,18 According to standard HPA procedures
for the identiﬁcation of Legionella, sputum samples were
plated directly onto selective media.19,20 Speciﬁc antibody
levels were assessed using indirect ﬂuorescent antibody test
(IFAT) at the reference laboratory for Legionella in the UK,
the HPA Respiratory and Systemic Infection Laboratory
(RSIL), Specialist and Reference Microbiology Division
(SRMD).
Environmental samples obtained were water and swabs
taken from devices that could have supported the growth of
Legionella species. The water samples were processed in the
Food, Water and Environmental Laboratory (FWE), Depart-
ment of Microbiology and Immunology, County Hospital,
Hereford and referred to the reference laboratory, the HPA
FWE Unit, Colindale. The swabs were referred to RSIL,
Colindale for PCR and direct immunoﬂuorescence.
Environmental investigation
Environmental investigations focused on cooling towers as
the potential source of exposure and registers held by the
local environmental health department were examined to
identify buildings with aerosol-producing devices. Identiﬁed
premises or cooling towers located within 1000m of the city
centre were targeted ﬁrst followed by others located
beyond 1000m. Investigators attempted to identify unregis-
tered premises through a variety of methods including
inspection from suitable vantage points.
Several sites with potential aerosol-generating systems,
such as domestic potable water systems, cooling towers, car
washes, decorative fountains, supermarket food display
units with a humidiﬁer and whirlpool spas on display
were identiﬁed based on the environmental investigation
and the information obtained from case questionnaires.
These sites were visited, the maintenance procedures and
logs were examined, the cooling towers inspected and
samples taken. Advice was given to those responsible for
the towers to have them decontaminated immediately
with biocidal agents. Investigators identiﬁed whether or
not the cooling towers had been running continuously.
Enquiries were also made about the respiratory health
status of employees at these sites. Most of the activities
associated with the environmental investigation occurred
between 5 and 12 November. Further environmental
investigations were carried out as more information became
available.
Environmental risk assessment
The GIS database was used to produce maps showing the
location of potential sources, cases’ residential location and
movements, and meteorological data. Information on case
movements obtained from the questionnaires were tran-
scribed into the GIS system then mapped to provide a
pictorial representation of each case’s daily movements for14 days prior to and including the date of onset of illness. On
the basis of the results obtained, seven sites of interest
(called A–G) were identiﬁed. Site B had two main
congregations of cooling towers and these were designated
B1 and B2.
To deﬁne the area of potential exposure, circles equiva-
lent to 250, 500 and 1000m were drawn centred on each of
the hypothetical sources. A ‘composite score’ was then
calculated for each source by allocating one point to each
source for each of the cases who had been either: (i) within
500m of the source; or, (ii) downwind within 1 km from the
source at any time during their incubation period. There-
fore, the maximum ‘score’ for each hypothetical source was
56 points (28 cases).
Data on the potential sources were input to a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet prior to analysis in EpiInfo version 6. Data
are presented as frequencies and proportions with 95%
conﬁdence intervals (CIs). When cooling towers were
compared, if the 95% CIs for the composite score did not
overlap, then the differences between the cooling towers
were considered to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Environmental health ofﬁcers obtained meteorological
data from a local school’s weather station. Wind direction
and velocity data for half hour periods from the end
of September until mid-November were incorporated
into the GIS database. Comparison with data produced by
a weather station at another site situated approxi-
mately 1 km from the city centre showed sufﬁcient correla-
tion between the two data sets to assume that the
data obtained from the school was valid. Further data and
advice was obtained from the National Meteorological
Ofﬁce.
We explored the relationship between daily movements
and wind direction and mapped all cases for the relevant
days they entered the area around the hypothetical sources.
We assessed whether they would have been downwind
within 1 km from the hypothetical source.Results
Case ﬁnding and descriptive epidemiology
Altogether, 28 epidemiologically linked cases met the
conﬁrmed case deﬁnition. The dates of onset of disease
ranged from 8 October to 20 November 2003. The median
age of the 28 cases was 59.5 years (range, 36–91 years) and
21 (75%) were male. All cases had a positive Legionella
urinary antigen (L. pneumophilia serogroup 1 (LP1)) test.
In addition, four cases had a single high titre for Legionella
antibody and two cases were culture positive. Twenty-three
cases (82%) were admitted to hospital and ﬁve cases
were treated at home. Two hospitalised cases died, there-
fore the case fatality rate was 8.7% for hospitalised
conﬁrmed cases and 7.1% for all conﬁrmed cases. Eight
cases (28.6%) had underlying conditions including: two
diabetics, three asthmatics, and one with chronic obstruc-
tive airways disease, two other cases were reported as being
immunosuppressed. Eighteen cases (64%) smoked, six cases
were ex-smokers and four cases were recorded as having
never smoked. None of the cases had travelled abroad in the
2 weeks before onset.
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The epidemiological interviews identiﬁed a possible link
with Hereford city centre. Twenty-three (82%) of the 28
conﬁrmed cases lived within the boundaries of Hereford
City, another two lived in Herefordshire county and had
visited or been in the vicinity of the city centre. Of the three
remaining cases: two were visitors from Wales and both had
visited Hereford on one occasion during their incubation
period, one on 23 October (date of onset 3 November) and
one on 26 October (date of onset 3 November); the third
non-Herefordshire resident visited Hereford on two occa-
sions, 25 October and 1 November (date of onset 7
November). The OCT therefore decided to focus the
investigation on potential sources of transmission in and
around the city centre.
Altogether, thirty premises were inspected of which six
were domestic potable water systems. The environmental
investigation also identiﬁed 24 business premises with
aerosol-producing devices such as cooling towers, decora-
tive fountains, whirlpool spas on display and supermarket
food display units with a humidiﬁer. These were assessed to
determine their compliance with operating regulations.
Following inspection, including examination of maintenance
records, sampling was carried out and, immediate deconta-
mination undertaken for all cooling towers. A total of 142
samples were taken from all premises visited. Of these 111
were taken from 50 cooling towers on 11 premises. LP1 was
found at three installations within two sites, two cooling
towers and a domestic spa pool. Both cooling towers were at
site B1. Although the cooling towers at this site had
previously been ‘decontaminated’ on 6 November, it was
discovered that the biocidal dosing had been sub-optimal.
Additionally, the cooling towers were only used seasonally
and had been started-up in late autumn. This is consistent
with the commencement of the outbreak. The cooling
towers were closed down on 12 November and an extensive
examination of the towers was undertaken as well as further
samples taken. Two samples taken from one of the towers
conﬁrmed the presence of L. pneumophila in numbers of
colony forming units greater than 106 per litre.
Molecular typing was undertaken on the LP1 isolates from
the towers and compared with the clinical isolates from twoTable 2 Cooling towers that were identiﬁed as potential sourc
Potential site/source No. (%, 95% CI) cases within No.
of outbreak 500m of source (n ¼ 28) of s
A 26 (92.9, 76.5–99.1) 24 (
B1 26 (92.9, 76.5–99.1) 27 (
B2 25 (89.2, 71.8–97.7) 27 (
C 10 (35.7, 18.6–55.9) 26 (
D 4 (14.3, 4.0–32.7) 26 (
E 4 (14.3, 4.0–32.7) 28 (
F 10 (35.7, 18.6–55.9) 25 (
G 5 (17.9, 6.1–36.9) 28 (
Composite score: obtained by adding score from previous two co
B1 and B2: two clusters of cooling towers on a single site.cases. The DNA proﬁles of the clinical isolates were
indistinguishable and matched those obtained from the
cooling towers at B1. The isolate from the domestic spa pool
tested positive for LP1 but no further testing was conducted
given that the epidemiological investigation pointed to-
wards Hereford City Centre as the most probable source of
infection.
Environmental risk assessment
Based on the descriptive epidemiology, almost all cases lived
or had travelled within 500m of site A and site B. Site B has
two main congregations of cooling towers (B1 and B2).
The composite score, deﬁned by distance and being
downwind of the suspected source (Table 2), showed that
sites A, B1 and B2 had signiﬁcantly more cases living or
travelling within 500m and who had been downwind of them
than all other suspect sources. This is reﬂected in the
composite score for B1 shown in Table 2, which is 53 (94.6%,
95% CIs 85.1%–98.9%). For source B2 the composite score of
52 (92.9%, 82.7%–98.0%) may reﬂect its close geographic
proximity to B1. Despite a concerted effort early in the
investigation, site A revealed no suspicious wet systems.
Discussion
LD was conﬁrmed in 28 people who lived, visited or passed
within 500m of Hereford city centre between 8 October and
20 November 2003. Linking together the results from the
epidemiological, environmental and microbiological inves-
tigations of this outbreak suggested that contaminated
aerosols from cooling towers at site B1 were responsible.
Legionella are biological contaminants present in cooling
towers, however, despite strict regulations concerning the
operation and maintenance of cooling towers, they are a
recognised source of transmission of LD and outbreaks have
been associated with towers that are inadequately main-
tained or restarted after a period of being shut-
down.4,5,21,22 The results of this investigation support these
previous reports and indicate that the onset of disease in the
ﬁrst case coincided with the restarting of a cooling tower
that had been inoperative for a while. There were no further
cases following closure and cleaning of the cooling tower.es of the Hereford 2003 Legionnaires’ outbreak.
(%, 95% CI) cases downwind Composite score (n ¼ 56)
ource (n ¼ 28) No. (%, 95% CI)
85.7, 67.3–96.0) 50 (89.3, 78.1–96.0)
96.4, 81.7–99.9) 53 (94.6, 85.1–98.9)
96.4, 81.7–99.9) 52 (92.9, 82.7–98.0)
92.9, 76.5–99.1) 36 (64.3, 50.4–76.6)
92.9, 76.5–99.1) 30 (53.6, 39.7–67.0)
100.0, 87.7–100.0) 32 (57.1, 43.2–70.3)
89.2, 71.8–97.7) 35 (62.5, 48.5–75.1)
100.0, 87.7–100.0) 33 (58.9, 45.0–71.9)
lumns.
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due to the large number of potential sources of environ-
mental contamination located in and around the city centre
and the wide-ranging movement of cases. The use of
a ‘composite score’ in this outbreak was an innovative
attempt by the OCT to identify the source of the outbreak
by quantifying the risk of exposure from each potential
source using proximity and meteorological data. The
composite score was signiﬁcantly higher for three of the
suspect sources and the use of microbiological data enabled
the investigation to focus on one particular source.
A number of studies have also examined proximity to the
source as a measure of risk,5,8,23,24 including some that
have attempted to incorporate the duration of time
spent within certain zones in order to determine a
dose–response effect.25 In this study a formal evaluation
of the association between disease and time spent at various
suspected locations was not conducted. However, the
results obtained suggest that even transient exposure
downwind of the source was enough to result in infection
in some susceptible people. The results obtained using the
composite score as a proxy for identifying potential sources
of Legionella transmission require corroboration from
additional studies.
The diagnosis of LD requires laboratory conﬁrmation
and in this outbreak urinary antigen testing was used
to conﬁrm the diagnosis in all 28 cases with subsequent
culture conﬁrmation in only two cases. It is important
to recognise the limitations of the urinary antigen test.
Although providing rapid diagnostic identiﬁcation that
aids clinical management and the possibility of timely
public health action, it is valid only for LP1 and a small
number of other Legionella species.26,27 Additionally,
although highly speciﬁc, a negative result does not exclude
Legionella infection particularly if the specimen is collected
in the ﬁrst week after onset of illness.28,29 Clinicians
should therefore be encouraged to obtain respiratory
specimens for culture in addition to using the urine antigen
test. Sole reliance on the results of urinary antigen testing
leads to underdiagnosis of other forms of Legionella and may
hamper public health investigation and control of an
outbreak. In this outbreak, as in previous in-
stances,3,5,23,25,30,31 the availability of cultures from both
clinical and environmental isolates and their comparison
using molecular typing permitted deﬁnite identiﬁcation of
the source of this outbreak and the rapid institution of
public health action.
In summary, this multidisciplinary investigation com-
bined epidemiological, environmental and microbiological
approaches and demonstrated that the source of this
outbreak was a cooling tower. The results of this investiga-
tion suggest that obtaining, typing and comparing environ-
mental and clinical specimens is of critical importance
in the public health investigation of Legionnaires’ outbreaks
and greatly improves the outcome of outbreak investiga-
tions.Acknowledgement
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